



Hegel's Idealist Reading of Spinoza

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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss Hegel's influential reading of Spinoza as a kind of idealist. I begin with a brief overview of Spinoza's doctrines of substance, mode, and attributes. I then turn to Hegel's arguments that Spinoza is an acosmicist (someone who denies the existence of finite individuals) and that Spinoza's attribute of thought becomes the sole fundamental attribute. Underlying both criticisms is Hegel's charge that Spinoza cannot consistently affirm his doctrine of substance and his doctrines of attribute and mode pluralism. In conclusion, I discuss the legacy of Hegel's idealist reading.

1. Introduction

Spinoza often wrote in terse, economic prose, as his perplexed readers know all too well. Even when friendly correspondents asked for clarifications, Spinoza frequently responded by simply repeating his original claim with an air of exasperation. Small wonder then that Spinoza's interpreters have credited him with so many disparate philosophical views, from atheism to pantheism, rationalism to mysticism, liberalism to communitarianism, and from physicalism to idealism. Entire generations of Spinoza studies have swung back and forth between some of these interpretive poles. This essay concerns one such swing: Spinoza as a kind of idealist. In this article, I focus on Hegel, the most famous proponent of an idealist reading of Spinoza. (In a companion article, 'More Recent Idealist Readings of Spinoza', I discuss Hegel's best legacy, 19th-century British interpreters, as well a new idealist reading from Michael Della Rocca.)

My approach to Hegel is more conceptual than historical. That is, I do not trace the influences on his interpretation of Spinoza. I instead attempt to unpack Hegel's own terse, economic prose and present what I take to be the best version of his idealist interpretation. Like other idealist interpreters, Hegel acknowledges that Spinoza sometimes tries to avoid idealistic conclusions. But, Hegel argues, Spinoza cannot consistently do so. Although Spinoza's ontology is supposed to contain a single, unified substance that contains a rich, internally diverse nature, Hegel charges, on Spinoza's own principles, that inner diversity is ultimately illusory. Thus for Hegel, Spinoza's collapse into idealism is symptomatic of Spinoza's larger philosophical failure.

I will here not pass judgment on Hegel's final conclusion. For regardless of whether he is correct, Hegel's criticisms penetrate to the heart of Spinoza's metaphysical ambitions. Hence, surveying Hegel's reading of Spinoza will illuminate Spinoza's own philosophical views, as well as introduce readers to a neglected but once dominant interpretation of Spinoza.

According to Hegel, the seeds of Spinoza's self-refutation lie in his ontology, so I will begin with an overview of Spinoza's core ontological commitments. Using that set-up, I will then explain what idealist readings of Spinoza have in common before presenting

Hegel's own case for interpreting Spinoza in such a light. I conclude with a brief note on the legacy of Hegel's idealist reading.

2. Brief Overview of Spinoza's Ontology¹

Spinoza's ontology seems quite straightforward. There are exactly two types of things that he admits into existence: substance and modes. Though striking, his account of how many tokens of each type exist is also quite straightforward: There is exactly one substance and there are infinitely many modes.

The terms 'substance' and 'mode' are by no means novel to Spinoza; Descartes, for instance, uses the same terminology. (In early writing, Spinoza had used the more traditional Aristotelian term 'accidents' instead of 'modes'.²) Spinoza even provides compact definitions of these categories. A substance is that which is 'in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed' (Id3). By contrast, modes are 'the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived' (Id5).

One traditional way to understand the difference is in terms of *dependence*. Substances are wholly independent: they are neither in nor conceived through anything else. They are, as Spinoza puts it, 'prior in nature' (Ip1). Modes, on the other hand, are *dependent* things: they inhere in and are conceived through that of which they are modifications. They are derivative beings, posterior in nature to substances. Modes must be modifications of something else; modes cannot exist on their own. But whereas modes exist in virtue of the existence of something else, substances exist in virtue of only themselves.

In the first half of Part One of the *Ethics* (through Ip15), Spinoza offers an elaborate proof that there is exactly one possible substance and that it necessarily exists.³ He follows this proof with a demonstration that the sole substance, by nature, has infinitely many modifications (Ip16). That is, one substance, infinitely many modes. How simple and clean! Indeed, this ontological picture is so straightforward that it can be hard to understand why Spinoza's ontology has generated 300 years of interpretive disagreement.

But I left out two details, and here is where things get messy. Although Spinoza's ontology admits of just two types of *things*, he has a third ontological category: attributes. And although they all count as modes, Spinoza distinguishes two *kinds* of modes: infinite modes and finite modes. Integrating these additional elements into the simple substance/mode picture with which we began is not easy.

Spinoza defines an attribute as 'what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence' (Id4), a definition that has produced great teeth-gnashing among interpreters. Here are a few of the hard knots surrounding Spinoza's theory of attributes. (i) What work is the reference to an intellect doing in the definition of attributes? Does the intellect *perceive* what objectively constitutes the essence of a substance, independent of its perceptions? Or does the intellectual perception partly *constitute* the essence of a substance? (ii) What is the constitution relation here? In Ip4d, Spinoza claims that a substance is 'the same' as its attributes – but how can that be, given Spinoza's further claim (Ip10s) that attributes can stand in a many-to-one relation to a substance? (iii) Does each attribute constitute *an* essence of substance – but how could one thing have multiple essences? – or *the* essence of substance – but how could two attributes each constitute the whole essence of a substance and remain distinct? (iv) Spinoza claims that God has 'an infinity' of parallel attributes, though we are only aware of two: Thought and Extension. How does Spinoza prove that God has so many attributes? Why are we aware of only

those two (Ep64–66)? How can one substance have even two, seemingly incompatible attributes in the first place (Ip10s)?

The introduction of finite modes brings with it another set of hard interpretative challenges. Spinoza claims in Ip16 that 'from the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes'. (i) Why do infinitely many modifications follow from the divine nature? (ii) Spinoza later distinguishes between the ways that infinite modes and finite modes follow from the divine nature. Whereas infinite modes follow directly from an attribute of God (or from a mode that itself follows directly from an attribute of God), finite modes follow from God's nature 'insofar as it is modified by a mode which is finite' (Ip28). This suggests that finite modes follow only from other finite modes, which themselves follow only from other finite modes, *ad infinitum*. What then is the relation between infinite and finite modes? Is the collection of finite modes itself an infinite mode? (iii) If finite modes do not follow directly from God's nature, where do they come from? Indeed, why are there finite modes in Spinoza's system in the first place, given this causal gap between infinite and finite modes? (iv) If it is the nature of finite modes to be 'a negation' (Ip8) or a limitation (Id2), how can a substance with a purely positive and unlimited nature contain any of them in the first place?

Some of these questions about attributes and finite modes are related. On the one hand, Spinoza clearly affirms substance monism, the view that there is exactly one fundamental entity, 'God or nature'. But his doctrines of attributes and modes also claim that the sole fundamental substance has an infinitely diverse internal structure on multiple levels: infinitely many attributes and infinitely many modes. But these commitments to *both* parsimony at the level of substance and pluralism at the level of attributes and modes do not sit well together, as Spinoza himself once noted.

In an early dialog (KV I.ii, 'First Dialogue'), Spinoza portrays Intellect and Reason as agreeing that Nature is 'completely infinite and supremely perfect', from which it follows that 'infinite Nature, in which everything is contained, is an eternal Unity, Infinite, omnipotent', which cannot be limited. Upon hearing this, the antagonist Lust replies with a hint of sarcasm, 'It will be marvelous indeed, if this should turn out to be consistent: that Unity agrees with the Diversity I see everywhere in Nature. But how could this be?' How, Lust wonders, can Spinoza reconcile his perfect, unlimited, unified substance with all the internal diversity of his attribute and mode pluralism? How, in short, can Spinoza maintain both his One and his Many?

The puzzlement and skepticism of Spinoza's Lust is the starting place of idealist interpretations of Spinoza. Idealist readings emphasize and elaborate on the tension between Spinoza's doctrine of substance monism and his doctrines of attribute and mode pluralism. They argue, in different ways, that these commitments are ultimately inconsistent with one another, and that Spinoza unwittingly shows us which commitment he would abandon: ontological diversity. According to idealist readings, though Spinoza is not always consistent, his principles, consistently applied, entail that the multiplicity of attributes and finite modes is unattainable and hence illusory.

More specifically, what I am calling idealist readings agree on the following two 'idealistic theses': (I) Spinoza's attribute of thought becomes the sole fundamental attribute in his system and (II) the existence of finite modes is illusory. Some idealist interpreters claim that Spinoza explicitly accepts these claims; others think he is forced to accept them on pains of inconsistency. But all agree that he ends up committed to some version of them, although they also add more critically that neither can be fully integrated into his system. What follows is an exploration of one such influential reading and criticism, in which we will discover the metaphysically rich connections between these theses.

3. Hegel

Hegel famously remarked that 'to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all philosophy' (LH 257). Of course, being called the *starting* point of anything by Hegel is a rather backhanded compliment, as starting points are the first in line to be refuted by the Hegelian dialectic. Still, it is clear that Hegel found many aspects of Spinoza's system congenial to his own, which meant that he devoted an especially large amount of space to showcasing the many *defects* of Spinoza. No other early modern philosopher received as much critical attention from Hegel.

Hegel's most well-known criticism is that Spinoza is an *acosmicist*, someone who denies the existence of finite individuals (idealist thesis II):

Spinozism might really just as well or even better have been termed acosmicism, since according to its teaching it is not to the world, finite existence, the universe, that reality and permanency are to be ascribed, but rather to God alone as the substantial. Spinoza maintains that there is no such thing as what is known as the world; it is merely a form of God, and in and for itself it is nothing. The world has no true reality, and all this that we know as the world has been cast in to the abyss of the one identity. There is therefore no such thing as finite reality, it has no truth whatever; according to Spinoza what is, is God, and God alone. (LH 281; cf. SL 258 and EL 226)⁴

In this passage, Hegel suggests that Spinoza's substance monism entails that there is 'no such thing as finite reality'. But why would the existence of a single substance entail the non-existence of non-substantial things like finite individuals? That would be to conflate *unreal* with *non-fundamental*. Why burden Spinoza with *that* confusion?

A few pages later, Hegel gestures at the following argument (LH 286):⁵

- (1) The nature of every finite thing involves negation.
- (2) Nothing that is real involves negation.
- (3) Therefore, there is no x such that x is a finite thing and x is real.

And once we add the self-evident axiom that only real things exist, Hegel reaches his conclusion of acosmicism. But does Spinoza accept the first two premises?

Spinoza affirms premise (1) in Ip8s1: '[B]eing finite is really, in part, a negation'. The second definition (Id2) clarifies this point: 'That thing is said to be finite it its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature'. That is, finite things are limited things whose nature is defined partly by reference to something else. As we saw in the previous section, this definitional feature also has a causal upshot for Spinoza: to be finite is, in part, to be the effect of another finite thing (Ip28). Spinoza often uses the term 'expression' in this context: the essence of finite individuals is a limited expression of a more real and self-contained nature (Ip25c), though Hegel prefers to cite a line from Ep50, 'determination is negation'. (Actually, Hegel frequently misquotes this by strengthening it to 'all' or 'every' determination is negation.)

The second premise is harder to follow. Why would being a limited expression of a more perfect thing entail being unreal? This sounds like trying to infer acosmicism directly from substance monism by the principle that to be somewhat limited is to be entirely unreal. But that principle is supposed to be the part of conclusion of acosmicism – it cannot be simply assumed in a premise without begging the question.

Here is a better reconstruction of what Hegel may have in mind. Let us start with an implication of (1) that Spinoza also seems willing to accept:

(1.5) If the nature of a finite thing involves negation, then its nature and existence must be derived from some more real substance.

Limited things are limited versions of some fuller, more unlimited nature on which they ontologically depend and from which their nature and existence can be deduced (Ip1; Ip16d). Limited things are ontologically posterior to the less limited things through which they are conceived and from which they necessarily follow. This premise gives rise to a slightly different charge:

(2*) The nature and existence of any finite thing cannot be derived from Spinoza's substance.

The conjunction of (1), (1.5), and (2*) also entails the conclusion of (3), assuming that no real state of affairs is contradictory.

On this reconstruction, the deeper source of Spinoza's acosmicism is his inability to construct or 'deduce' finite things from the nature of the sole substance.⁶ Hegel frequently makes this charge: '[Spinoza] merely assumes individual determinations, and does not deduce them from substance' (LH 289; cf. SL 537). Of course, Hegel is aware that Spinoza's definitions leave room for finite things (Id2 and Id5), but these definitions are 'solely and simply accepted and assumed, not deduced, nor proved to be necessary' (LH 283). Hegel adds, 'it is really a weak point in Spinoza that he begins thus with definitions' (LH 263).

How does Hegel argue for (2*), the crucial premise in his argument for acosmicism? One possibility is that Hegel heavy-handedly insists that Spinoza use Hegel's own dialectical logic to deduce the existence of finite things from the existence of substance, a demand that Hegel thinks Spinoza cannot satisfy. But that very demand would be inconsistent with Hegel's belief that rival philosophical systems *internally* contain the seeds of their self-refutation.⁷

Here is a more charitable possibility. After all, Spinoza himself insists that the existence and nature of finite things necessarily 'follows from' substance and its attributes, though in a qualified way (Ip28). But why, we may ask, does a plurality of modes follow from the nature of substance in the first place? Spinoza *asserts* that it does in Ip16, relying on the principle that an intellect 'infers more properties [that follow from a thing] the more the definition of the thing expresses reality'. That is, the more perfect a thing is, the more modifications will follow from its nature. But, Hegel wonders, *why think that?* That sounds like a brute assertion of the principle Spinoza was supposed to be demonstrating. Spinoza's unwillingness to say more, Hegel concludes, points to Spinoza's inability to provide a genuine demonstration.

This means that Hegel's premise should be weakened slightly:

(2**) Spinoza fails to prove that the nature and existence of any finite thing can be derived from his substance.

Hence the conclusion will be weakened as well:

(3*) Spinoza fails to prove that there are any finite things.

But from Spinoza's perspective, that conclusion would be bad enough. Given Spinoza's insistence on the thoroughly intelligible and demonstrable character of his system, if

Spinoza had to fall back on a brute, unexplained fact as the basis of mode pluralism, Hegel will have provided a very damaging, internal critique of Spinozism.

The charge of acosmicism – or something close to it – mirrors another Hegelian conclusion. According to Hegel, Spinoza fails to show how there can be *any* diversity in the nature of substance, including diversity among its attributes: 'Spinoza does not demonstrate how these two [attributes] are evolved from the one substance' (LH 268–9). He asks, 'And whence come these two forms [i.e., attributes] themselves?' and answers, 'the determinations are not developed from substance, it does not resolve itself into these attributes' (LH 264). That is, the real source of acosmicism – a failure to derive diversity from the nature of the unified and unlimited substance – also generates a concern about attribute plurality in Spinoza's system. Why is there more than one fundamental attribute, much less 'an infinity' of them?

Here we discover the historically close association between idealist readings of Spinoza and what is now called the 'subjectivist' interpretation of Spinoza's attributes. Hegel claims that Spinoza fails to derive a plurality of equally fundamental attributes from his concept of substance. But Spinoza clearly asserts that there is such a plurality (Ip11). Is Spinoza therefore inconsistent? A possible reconciliation is to claim that the distinctions among attributes are generated by an intellect and do not correspond to the nature of substance itself. This is the central thesis of the subjectivist interpretation of the attributes. Although the intellect perceives substance *as if* it had a plurality of attributes, substance in itself does not have this internal diversity.

Though it was surely not Spinoza's intent, attribute subjectivism is not quite as textually free-floating as one might initially think. The definition of 'attribute' cited in the previous section covers up an ambiguity in the original Latin. Spinoza defines attributes as what 'an intellect perceives of a substance, as [*tanquam*] constituting an essence of substance'. But *tanquam*, here translated as 'as', can also have the force of 'as if'. According to the subjectivist interpretation, Spinoza never intended an objective diversity of attributes in Id4; intellects (presumably finite ones) perceive substance *as if* it were constituted by distinct attributes, but that perception does not correspond to the nature of substance as an indivisible unity.

Although Hegel and others have embraced this subjectivist reconciliation,⁸ we should be careful to distinguish it from idealist thesis I – the priority of the attribute of thought – even if they spring from the same sources. Some subsequent interpreters have embraced attribute subjectivism while resisting the priority of Thought, whereas others have affirmed the priority of Thought while denying the subjectivist reading.⁹ The distinction turns on whether in (allegedly) prioritizing the attribute of thought as uniquely fundamental, Spinoza still has room for a genuine plurality of non-fundamental attributes. (Spinoza's own insistence on the independence of attributes in Ip10 suggests no.) Once again, we are confronted with the question of whether being non-fundamental (a non-thinking attribute) entails being unreal (a non-attribute).

But for Hegel, at least, idealism and attribute subjectivism go hand in hand. Instead of showing how distinctions between attributes are generated from the concept of substance itself, Spinoza instead appeals to an aspect of Thought in his definition of attributes in order to show how there can be a plurality of attributes in a single substance. We saw that Spinoza made a similar appeal to an intellect when trying to establish the existence of infinitely many modes in Ip16d. But, Hegel reasons, the fact that Spinoza appeals to something other than substance (namely, an intellect) whenever he tries to establish diversity shows us that the unified nature of substance itself is unable to ground such diversification: 'This is what we find philosophically inadequate in Spinoza; distinctions

are externally present [i.e., in Thought], but they remain external, since even the negative is not known in itself' (LH 288).

And so, Hegel concludes, the attribute of thought must play a uniquely fundamental role in Spinoza's system (idealist thesis I). Activities of thought are what diversify the unified nature of substance into a multiplicity of attributes and modes. Thought provides the grounds for all 'determinate' differences, a point that is reinforced by Spinoza's repeated appeals to conceptual relations in the opening definitions of his ontology. 'Thus substance is conceived through itself; attribute is not conceived through itself, but has a relation to the conceiving understanding, in so far as this last conceives reality; mode, finally, is what is not conceived as reality, but through and in something else' (LH 260). One may respond that the role of Thought in these opening definitions is not constitutive; Thought and the intellect are merely conceptualizing some diversity in substance that is already there in its nature. But this is just the point that Hegel finds unproven: 'The unity of existence and universal thought is asserted from the very first, and this unity will ever be the question at issue' (LH 258).

The parallel between Hegel's criticisms of Spinoza's attributes and modes is illuminating. His fundamental charge is that Spinoza cannot prove that his substance admits of a diversity of attributes or finite modifications except by definitional stipulation or by an appeal to an external source – mental relations – whose role cannot be justified by Spinoza's own principles. 'But in the said absolute, which is only unmoved identity, *the attribute, like the mode, is only as vanishing, not as becoming, so that here, too, the vanishing takes its positive beginning only from without*' (LH 269, my emphasis).

The criticism that the diversity of attributes and modes Spinoza promises are ultimately illusory gives rise to Hegel's pithier and oft-repeated pronouncements against Spinoza. Despite Spinoza's claims about the rich diversity of the world, his substance is actually 'the dark, shapeless abyss, so to speak, in which all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void, and which produces nothing out of itself that has a positive subsistence of its own' (EL 227). And so, lacking a principle to move from the unity of substance to the diversity of attributes and modes, Spinoza's system 'comes to no vitality, spirituality, or activity. His philosophy has only a rigid and unyielding substance' (LH 288).¹⁰

Hence, Hegel concludes, Spinoza fails to show how his perfectly unified substance gives rise to any real internal diversity. Spinoza may want the One *and* the Many, but he ends up stuck with just the One, an empty unity that 'swallows up' all diversity and determinate content. And so although acosmicism is Hegel's most well-known objection to Spinoza, for Hegel it is actually symptomatic of a deeper Spinozistic failure to find within the nature of his substance the grounds for multiplicity of any kind.

Hegel realizes, of course, that Spinoza *tries* to deny the idealist theses, as they are inconsistent with Spinoza's stated ontology of co-fundamental attributes and plentifully many finite modes. But, according to Hegel, Spinoza also cannot avoid them (and at points even voices them), making Hegel's reading of Spinoza's idealism quite critical in its final judgment: Spinoza can neither accept nor avoid these idealist theses.

4. The Legacy of Hegel's Interpretation

Prior to the 19th-century, Spinoza's name was used mostly as an intellectual weapon. To be labeled a Spinozist was to have one's livelihood – sometimes even life – placed in jeopardy. The role of Spinoza in the so-called 'Pantheism Controversy' at the close of the 18th-century highlights Spinoza's continued function as an intellectual boogeyman. In light of this use of Spinoza, Hegel's explicit attempt to engage Spinoza on Spinoza's

own terms highlights an important shift in the history of Spinoza studies. Although the lack of a good critical edition of Spinoza's works continued to hamper interpretation through much of the 19th century, gradually commentators exhibited greater care, distance, and historical sensitivity when studying Spinoza's system.¹¹

Even so, Hegel's own interpretative shadow continued to heavily influence the next 100 years of Spinoza scholarship to a degree that is difficult to overstate. Even when subsequent interpreters disagreed with the details of Hegel's reading, they often presented the options in the framework that Hegel had so firmly cemented.¹² Spinoza as an inconsistent idealist became a common interpretive lens, even as the accounts of his system grew more rigorous and textually based.

Near the end of the 19th century, Spinoza studies in English attained a new level of scholarly excellence, laying the grounds for what we might now call a 'school' of Spinoza interpretation. These mostly British interpreters worked with primary material unavailable to Hegel and read Spinoza's texts far more closely than Hegel seems to have done. They presented their interpretations in more systematic, historically accurate, and clearly written ways. They rejected Hegel's telic thesis that Spinozism, carried through to its full dialectical conclusion, ends in absolute idealism. They developed their own distinctive framework for approaching Spinoza's metaphysics, and their work heavily shaped Anglo-American Spinoza studies for the next 50 years.

But despite their significant differences with Hegel, this British school of Spinoza interpretation also attributed our two idealist theses to Spinoza, even if with greater reluctance. They even agreed with the final, dismal judgment of Hegel that these theses highlight for us Spinoza's ultimate philosophical failure. In that sense, Hegel's legacy remained alive and well among Anglo-American Spinoza scholars into the early 20th century.

Whether Hegel's idealist conclusions and criticisms are merited remains an issue worth consideration by Spinoza's contemporary readers. Although the idealist reading of Spinoza, once dominant, was later widely rejected during the mid to late 20th century, it remains a live interpretative option with recent advocates (see the companion essay, 'More Recent Idealist Readings of Spinoza'.) Hence the full story of Hegel's influence on Spinoza interpretation may yet lie in our future.

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Short Biography

Samuel Newlands' research interests include 17th-century philosophy, philosophy of religion, and contemporary metaphysics. He has published on philosophy in a variety of venues, such as *Noûs*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Oxford Handbook to Spinoza*, and *The Routledge Companion to Seventeenth Century Philosophy*. He is the co-editor of *Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams* (OUP 2009). He has received a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities for his work on Spinoza and is currently co-directing a four-year research initiative, 'The Problem of Evil in Modern and Contemporary Thought' (<http://evilandtheodicy.com>). He is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Prior to arriving at Notre Dame, he completed his PhD in philosophy at Yale University.

Notes

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- ¹ For a complete overview, see Lin, 'Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza'.
- ² Spinoza explains his shift to modes in CM I.i.
- ³ For an overview of this proof, see Newlands, 'Spinoza's Modal Metaphysics'.
- ⁴ For a discussion of the origin of Hegel's charge, see Melamed, 'Salomon Maimon and the Rise of Spinozism in German Idealism'.
- ⁵ For alternative reconstructions of Hegel's argument, see Parkinson, 'Hegel, Pantheism, and Spinoza'; Melamed 'Acosmicism or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite'; and Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics*, 27–50.
- ⁶ One might object that this ignores Spinoza's category of *infinite* modes, which Hegel mostly ignores. But as we'll see, Hegel's real objection is to the failure to prove Ip16, which would apply to any kind of modes.
- ⁷ For a version of this reading, see Melamed, 'Acosmicism or Weak Individuals?', 82–3.
- ⁸ Leroy Loemker suggests that Leibniz was one of the first to raise this possibility (see Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 198).
- ⁹ For the former, see Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 74. For the latter, see the discussion of Michael Della Rocca in the companion essay, 'More Recent Idealist Readings of Spinoza'.
- ¹⁰ According to Hegel, the missing principle of movement is self-negating negation.
- ¹¹ For a helpful overview of Spinoza's reception in continental Europe in the 19th century, see André Tosel, Pierre-François Moreau, and Jean Salem (eds.), *Spinoza au XIX^e siècle*. In his essay in the volume, Piet Steenbakker helpfully speculates on why the German critical editions tended to be so bad, despite the rising standards of German philology in other domains.
- ¹² See, for instance, the dispute between then-leading history of philosophy scholars Kuno Fischer and Johann Erdmann on the status of the attributes.

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